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In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two ﬁrms play an inﬁnitely-
repeated Bertrand game when each ﬁrm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding ﬁrms,
ﬁxing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We
emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide ﬁrms with a strate-
gic opportunity to exploit an interaction between internal contracting and market-sharing
arrangement: the contracts with agents may be used to induce ﬁrms’ truthful communica-
tion in their collusion, and collusive market-share allocation may act to reduce the agents’
information rents.
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Collusions in practice are often characterized by price-ﬁxing and market-share allocation.1 Along
with such actual features, recent theoretical work has shed light on diverse aspects of collusion in
prices and quantities. An important feature in recent theoretical work is that the state of ﬁrms’
production costs is regarded as private information. Aoyagi (2003), Athey and Bagwell (2001,
2006), Athey et al. (2004) and Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) develop models of this kind,
where ﬁrms play a repeated Bertrand pricing game or repeated procurement auctions.2 Despite
t h e i rr i c ha n a l y s e so fc o l l u s i o n ,t h o s et h e o r e t i c a l models have given no attention to the possibility
that the location private information is the hired agents who produce ﬁrms’ outputs. By contrast,
private information, held by agents, as to the state of production has received extensive attention
in the literature, and in practice, productions are often accomplished by agents on a contractual
basis. In this paper, building on recent work on theory of collusion, we investigate how the
presence of privately-informed agents aﬀects a commonly observed collusive behavior, price-ﬁxing
with market-share allocation.
Our paper develops a model of collusion in which two ﬁrms play an inﬁnitely-repeated Bertrand
game, and uses work by Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004) as a benchmark.
Following their models, we consider the environment in which ﬁrm actions are publicly observed.
A novelty of our model is that each ﬁrm has a privately-informed agent: private information is
held by the agent who produces output for the ﬁrm. Employing Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE),
we establish two diﬀerent classes of equilibria, asymmetric and symmetric PPE, to describe the
features that would not be observed without the presence of privately-informed agents.
There is a two-tier relationship in our model: each ﬁrm writes to its agent a law-enforced
contract and makes a self-enforced agreement with its rival ﬁrm. In each period, each agent
privately observes its cost type. The cost type is high or low and i.i.d. across agents and time.3
Each agent makes a report of cost type to its ﬁrm. The ﬁrm then makes a cost announcement to its
rival ﬁrm, sets prices and allocates market shares. In an ideal collusive scheme, setting high prices,
ﬁrms would allocate market shares by the criterion of productive eﬃciency, whereby all production
is assigned to the agent(s) with the lowest production cost. Given the two types of relationship, a
major diﬃculty with ﬁnding an optimal collusion is to establish a two-tier revelation mechanism
that induces agents to make truthful reports and ﬁrms to make truthful announcements.
We ﬁrstly analyze an asymmetric PPE (APPE), and show how the presence of privately-
1Whinston (2006) surveys theoretical and empirical literature on price-ﬁxing collusions, and Harrington (2006)
provides patterns of price and market allocation in real cartels.
2Some recent literature explores self-enforcing trade agreements among privately-informed countries. See, e.g.,
Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Lee (2007) and Martin and Vergote (2007).
3Private information in our model is transitory. If private information is persistent, then the analysis will be more
complicated; a ﬁm’s action may signal its information and aﬀect its rival’s belief. For related recent work, see
Athey and Bagwell (2006).
1informed agents aﬀects the APPE-value set when ﬁrm strategies are unrestricted (possibly asym-
metric). Colluding ﬁrms would intend to communicate truthfully to allocate market shares by the
criterion of productive eﬃciency. To achieve productive eﬃciency, the ﬁrm that announces high
cost must give up its market share when the rival announces low cost. There are contrasting incen-
tive problems in the model. At the inter-ﬁrm level, a high-cost ﬁrm has an incentive to understate
the reported high cost in the hope of increasing its market share, given that each ﬁrm privately
observes its agent’s report. To elicit the high-cost ﬁrm’s truthfulness today, a high continuation
value (as future reward) is aﬀorded to the ﬁrm that reports high cost.4 At the intra-ﬁrm level,
a low-cost agent has an incentive to overstate the observed low cost in the hope of receiving the
greater transfer payment for a given level of production. To elicit the low-cost agent’s truthful
reports, internal contract grants information rents to the agent who reports low cost.5
Interestingly, these contrasting incentives can work to the colluding ﬁrms’ advantage.6 Consider
ﬁrst the eﬀect of collusion on internal contract. If colluding ﬁrms coordinate to allocate market
shares by the criterion of productive eﬃciency, then a low-cost agent who reports high cost will be
paid nothing (because of no production) when the other ﬁrm announces low cost. Market-allocation
collusion may thus soften the low-cost agent’s incentive to overstate the observed cost type and
make it less costly to induce the agent’s truthfulness in terms of information rents. Consider next
the eﬀect of internal contract on collusion. If an internal contract speciﬁes that a high-cost agent
receives a large payment when the agent produces more than a predetermined level of output, then
the contract acts to soften the high-cost ﬁrm’s current-period incentive to understate the reported
cost type and thus reduce the corresponding continuation-value (future) reward.7
Our analysis of APPE, building on the “no-agent” model by Athey and Bagwell (2001), has
the following distinct features. We show that the existence of privately-informed agents may
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the APPE-value set. As in their paper, we establish a Pareto-frontier line
4In practice, the cartels prosecuted by the U.S. Antitrust Division are found to use rather sophisticated schemes. For
instance, many cartels have used “future markets” as a channel of exchanging direct side-payments. They used a
compensation scheme, whereby any ﬁrm that had sold more than its allotted share was required in the following budget
period to purchase the excess from an underbudget ﬁrm that had not reached its allocation target in the preceding
period (Business Week, July 27, 1998).
5The internal incentive problem is not new; a similar and more generalized incentive problem is widely found in the
mechanism design literature (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) and in the extensive “transfer pricing” literature. For a
classic evidence on agent’s overstating behavior, see Schiﬀ and Lewin (1970), and for agent’s cost-padding behavior, see
Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
6The contrasting incentives between informed and uninformed parties diﬀer from the “countervailing incentives”
faced only by an informed party, as seen in Lewis and Sappington (1989), Spiegel and Spulber (1997) and others.
7Continuation values in our paper play the role of side-payments in a legalized cartel. The models with legalized
cartel (e.g., Roberts, 1985; Cramton and Palfrey, 1990; Kihlstrom and Vives, 1992) show that communication helps
ﬁrms to identify the most eﬃcient ﬁrm, and side-payments provide ﬁrms with truth-telling incentives. Our analysis, in
its relation to literature on repeated procurement auctions, may describe the case in which (i) two collusive bidders play
a knockout auction, prior to actual bidding, to ﬁnd who will be a lowest-cost supplier (e.g., McAfee and McMillan,
1992), and (ii) each bidder suﬀers some costs of distorting information, were it to lie.
2segment of APPE values. Construction of the line segment is possible only when the segment is
suﬃciently long, so that a high-cost ﬁrm is persuaded to be truthful today by a suﬃciently high
continuation value drawn within the segment even if the ﬁrm may end up with zero market share.8
In the model, agents hold private information and ﬁrms deliver it following the agents’ report.
Having an incentive to distort the agents’ private information, ﬁrms use the internal contract and
endogenize the level of costs a high-cost ﬁrm suﬀers when it falsiﬁes its agent’s report. As argued
above, such a contractual arrangement reduces the continuation-value reward that is necessary
to induce the high-cost ﬁrms’ current-period truthfulness, which relaxes the constraint that the
s e g m e n tm u s tb es u ﬃciently long. In this way, the internal contract acts as a commitment device
that elicits the ﬁrm’s truthfulness. As a result, an interaction between collusion and internal
contracting can be exploited: a contractual arrangement is used to achieve productive eﬃciency in
market-allocation collusion, and productive eﬃciency in market allocation, in turn, enhances the
contractual eﬃciency by reducing information rents for agents. This interaction also applies to the
analysis of a symmetric PPE.
We secondly analyze a symmetric PPE (SPPE), and investigate how the presence of privately-
informed agents aﬀects the SPPE-value set when there is a symmetry restriction on ﬁrm strategies.
Symmetry here means that current-period prices and market-share allocations must be symmetric
across ﬁrms for all histories. The corresponding value set is then restricted to the 45-degree line,
and the Pareto frontier is reduced to a point, not a line segment. In the APPE we construct, a
continuation-value loss for one ﬁrm implies a continuation-value gain for another along the Pareto-
frontier segment; continuation-value transfers do not cause ineﬃciency along the segment. In any
SPPE, by contrast, continuation-value variations entail some waste of values for all ﬁrms together;
continuation-value transfers are wasteful on the 45-degree line.
We construct an SPPE in which to prevent the high-cost ﬁrm’s understatement today, a low
continuation value (as future penalty) is given to the ﬁrms that announce low cost together. In our
model, a simple commitment device of contract is used so that a high-cost ﬁrm gains nothing today
when it lies and increases its market share above the predetermined level. It then becomes unneces-
sary to penalize the low-cost ﬁrms with the low-continuation value. Thus, with a simple contractual
arrangement, ﬁrms are induced to be truthful without depending on wasteful continuation-value
transfers. This ﬁnding shows that the symmetry restriction aﬀects characteristics of SPPE diﬀer-
ently between our model and the no-agent model: SPPE suﬀers a waste of equilibrium values in
the no-agent model, but it can approximate the optimal monopoly proﬁt despite the symmetry
restriction in our model.
Our analysis of APPE and SPPE is based on the assumption that information as to the state of
production cost is asymmetrically held by agents. If ﬁrms can observe their agents’ cost types at
no cost, then our model becomes the no-agent model. If ﬁrms can observe their agents’ cost types
8We establish a self-generating set of APPE values, following the recursive structure explored by Abreu et al. (1986,
1990), whereby after any history, the set of continuation values are always equal to the equilibrium value set.
3only after incurring informational costs, then our ﬁndings imply that colluding ﬁrms may ﬁnd it
beneﬁcial to deliberately restrict their own observability of agents’ cost types until signing the
internal contract. At a broad level, our paper predicts that in the presence of privately-informed
agents, ﬁrms may ﬁnd it relatively easy to achieve an optimal APPE and save a potential waste of
optimal SPPE values.9 In the literature, ﬁrms own private information. Firms there can observe
and distort private information at no extra costs. In this paper, agents hold private information
and ﬁrms deliver it. The contractual arrangement in this paper captures the circumstance in which
ﬁrms deliberately reduce the degree to which they control of private information; their incentive
to distort the agents’ private information is bounded by the contract with agents. We ﬁnd that
a simple contractual arrangement that reduces the ﬁrms’ incentive to distort the agents’ private
information makes it possible to establish a suﬃciently long Pareto-frontier segment in APPE and
avoid wasteful continuation-value transfers in SPPE.
Our model also contrasts with the no-agent model by Athey et al. (2004) in which cost types are
continuously distributed. They predict that when the distribution of cost types is log-concave, opti-
mal SPPE is characterized by a pooling equilibrium in which market shares are constant regardless
of cost types; ﬁrms sacriﬁce productive eﬃciency and instead save informational costs that would
be necessary to deter higher-cost ﬁrms from mimicking lower-cost ﬁrms. In our two-type model,
ﬁrms achieve productive eﬃciency in market allocation, which, in turn, reduces informational costs.
Our ﬁndings provide a new perspective on collusive behavior: the presence of privately-informed
agents may provide ﬁrms with a strategic opportunity to exploit the interaction between internal
contracting and market-sharing arrangement. A variety of strategic contracting devices have been
highlighted by the literature.10 There is a broad analogy between our analysis and the work done
by Fershtman and Judd (1987) or by Fershtman et al. (1991). They show that a ﬁrm may compete
more eﬀectively in a Cournot oligopoly game, or collude more eﬀectively with the other ﬁrm, if its
manager enters this game and is bounded by a wage contract. Likewise, we show that ﬁrms may
collude more eﬀectively when they are bounded by a strategic use of internal contract.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model, and describes
the approach we use in the paper. Section 3 describes the constraints that equilibrium strategies
must satisfy. Section 4 characterizes an APPE, where ﬁrm strategies are unrestricted. Section
5 describes an SPPE, where ﬁrm strategies are restricted to be symmetric. Section 6 discusses
possible extensions of the model. Section 7 provides conclusions.
9Related theme is found in the literature. Using an principal-agent setting, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)
show that the contracting parties may ﬁnd it desirable to deliberately restrict the observability of principal. Lee (2003)
argues that the scope of intertemporal price discrimination may diminish if a monopolist has more information
as to consumers’ past purchasing history.
10Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Katz (1991), Reitman (1993), Sklivas (1987), Spagnolo (2000),
and Kockesen and Ok (2004) show that incentive contracts with delegated agents can serve as a strategic commitment
device.
42. TheModel
T h e r ea r et w oe xa n t ei d e n t i c a lﬁrms. A novel feature in our model is that each ﬁrm has a privately-
informed agent: private information is held by the agent who produces output for the ﬁrm. Prices
and quantities are publicly observed, but unit costs are privately observed by the agent. In each
period, costs are independently drawn from the identical common-knowledge distribution with
discrete support {θL,θH}. Ac o s tt y p eθL (θH) is drawn with probability µ (probability 1 − µ).
For notational simplicity, deﬁne the cost diﬀerential as 4 ≡ θH − θL > 0 and denote the discrete
support as {L,H}. The main purpose of our analysis is to highlight how the presence of privately-
informed agents aﬀects a commonly observed collusive behavior, price-ﬁxing with market-share
allocation. To this end, we assume that there is a unit mass of homogeneous consumers whose
v a l u a t i o no ft h eg o o di sρ. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes our analysis, since the problem of
ﬁnding an optimal collusion can be reduced to that of ﬁnding market-share allocations, given that
patient ﬁrms will not undercut the optimal ﬁxed price ρ, w h i c hi sa s s u m e dt ob eh i g h e rt h a nθH.
2.1. Optimal Values
In this subsection, as a motivating benchmark, we consider a contracting game in which a monop-
olist oﬀers a contract to two privately-informed agents. Our later analysis will show that colluding
ﬁrms may be able to replicate the monopolist’s optimal behavior. The timing of the game is as
follows: (i) each agent i privately observes its cost type θi ∈ {L,H}, (ii) the monopolist oﬀers a
single-period contract to each agent, (iii) each agent i makes a report ri ∈ {L,H} to the ﬁrm,
(iv) the monopolist determines a production level for each agent, qi, and each agent produces the
quantity and (v) the monetary transfers requested by the contract are enforced.
The ﬁrm determines the level of output subsequent to the agents’ report. The production
level assigned for agent i, qi, is conditional on the agents’ report. Thus, the production level
is determined by a production-allocation scheme, qi : {L,H}×{ L,H} → Q, where Q ≡ [0,1].
The contract for agent i is a pair,
©
ti,qiª
, where ti is the payment for agent i. At y p e - θj agent
has utility ti − θjqi if the agent produces qi and receives monetary transfer ti, and any type
of agent gets zero utility if the agent refuses the contract. In a pair of cost types (θj,θk),θ j
is agent 1’s cost type and θk is agent 2’s cost type. The pair (θj,θk) is hereafter indexed by
(j,k) ∈ {(L,L),(L,H),(H,L),(H,H)}. Let pjk represent the price selected for state (j,k) and
let ti
jk and qi
jk represent the transfer for agent i in (j,k) and the quantity produced by agent


















We now ﬁnd an optimal contract of the monopolist.


























































H for agent 2.
Note that we use dominant-strategy incentive constraints to ﬁnd the optimal contract. In this
context, however, the contract can be equivalently i m p l e m e n t e di nB a y e s i a no ri nd o m i n a n ts t r a t e g y
if the expected output decreases in cost type (qi
L > qi
H), this being satisﬁed in the solution.11
Hence, there is no loss of generality in looking for the optimal contract within the set of dominant-
strategy implementation. It is implied by optimality that incentive compatibility for “low-cost”
agents, IC1
Lk, and individual rationality for “high-cost” agents, IR1
H, are binding. Observing that
t h e r ei ss o m ef r e e d o mi nt h ec h o i c eo ft1
HL and t1
HH, we can ﬁnd many transfer schemes that satisfy
these binding constraints. One candidate is that for k ∈ {L,H}, high-cost agents participate in all
states of nature, t1
Hk = θHq1










low-cost agent i is induced to be truthful by the expected information rent 4·qi
H.
Given that all the candidates derive the same expected proﬁt, the Monopolist’s Problem now
















where CL and CH represent the virtual (unit) costs associated with productions of low- and high-
cost agents:




11The use of dominant-strategy implementation is due to Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992). They show that the
equivalence between Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementations holds if the agents’ cost functions satisfy
a generalized single crossing property. This property trivially holds in our model.
6The virtual costs include informational costs of eliciting the agents’ truthfulness, which are reﬂected
in the additional terms
µ





LL =1 , and (iii) q1
HH + q2
HH =1if ρ ≥ CH, and q1
HH + q2
HH =0otherwise. In this
paper, we say that productive eﬃciency is achieved if these three conditions hold. The conditions
mean that all production is assigned to the agent(s) with the lowest production cost: in (L,H)
or (H,L), the lowest-cost agent alone produces the output, and in (L,L) or (H,H), agents may
together produce the total output. In the parameter range ρ<C H, informational costs of eliciting
the agents’ truthfulness make the production in (H,H) unproﬁtable.
There is a striking beneﬁt of achieving productive eﬃciency: production is carried out only
by the lowest-cost agent(s), and further, productive eﬃciency enhances contractual eﬃciency by
reducing information rents. Under productive eﬃciency, the virtual costs in (L,L), (L,H) or (H,L)
are only production costs θL; the virtual cost gap between the high- and low-cost agent is then
CH −CL = 4+
µ
1−µ4, which is more than the gap between cost types, θH −θL = 4. The virtual
costs are higher than production costs only in (H,H), and thus the expected information rents
are reduced to (1 − µ)2(CH − θH)=µ(1 − µ)4·(q1
HH + q2
HH). The overall expected costs are
[1 − (1 − µ)2]θL +( 1− µ)2CH = E(θ) if ρ ≥ CH, and [1 − (1 − µ)
2]θL otherwise.
Lemma 1. The optimal monopoly proﬁti s
πm ≡
½
ρ − E(θ) if ρ ≥ CH
[1 − (1 − µ)
2](ρ − θL) otherwise.
(4)
The ﬁrst-best proﬁti sπf ≡ ρ−[1−(1−µ)2]θL−(1−µ)2θH, which is what the ﬁrm could earn if it
were able to observe the agents’ cost types. In the presence of privately-informed agents, πf >π m.
If ρ ≥ CH, the proﬁtd i ﬀerential is the information rents: πf −πm = µ(1−µ)4.I fρ<C H, the ﬁrm
incurs no information rents but sacriﬁces the proﬁti n(H,H): πf − πm =( 1− µ)
2 (ρ − θH).12 In
this paper, we say that ﬁrms achieve an optimal collusion if they earn πm as their per-period joint
proﬁt. For later use, we deﬁne a value set V m ≡ {(u1,u 2):u1 + u2 = πm
1−δ}, where δ is common
discount factor.
We lastly clarify the assumptions thatw eh a v em a d et od e r i v eL e m m a1 .T h eﬁrst assumption
is that there is no side-contracting collusion between agents; agents across ﬁrms cannot form a
cartel to make collusive reports using side-payments.13 The second assumption is that the ﬁrm
can make an ex ante commitment to production schedules. Under ρ<C H, before the agent’s
report, the virtual cost of producing q1
HH + q2
HH =1is CH, which is too high. After the agents’
12The assumption, ρ>θ H, ensures that π
f >π
m. If θL <ρ≤ θH, then π
m = π
f. We ignore the parameter
range θL <ρ≤ θH, where our analysis becomes trivially simple, given that a high-cost ﬁrm has no incentive to produce
any output and mimic a low-cost type.
13Our paper does not allow any form of side-payment across ﬁrms or across agents. Laﬀont and Martimort (1997,
2000) characterize optimal collusion-proof mechanisms when privately-informed agents are collusive in their side-
contracting games. In related work, Che and Kim (2007) and Dequiedt (2007) study collusion-proof mechanisms
in auction.
7report of (H,H), however, the ﬁrm may be tempted to produce q1
HH + q2
HH =1if the contract
is renegotiable.14 In later analysis, production schedule in any state is achieved by a self-enforced
agreement.
2.2. Nash-Equilibrium Values
In this subsection, we look for the Nash-equilibrium values. There are two ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm
now has a privately-informed agent. Departing from the monopoly model, we introduce a new
notation for the payment scheme for each agent. The payment function for agent i is a mapping,
ti : {L,H}×Q → R. A typical payment for agent i is denoted by ti(qi,ri) when agent i makes a
report of ri ∈ {L,H} and produces qi ∈ [0,1].
To ﬁnd Nash-equilibrium values, we proceed with two steps. First, suppose that each ﬁrm knows
its agent’s cost at no information rents. A high-cost ﬁrm charges price at θH, and a low-cost ﬁrm
mixes, earning the expected proﬁt (1 − µ)4 by slightly undercutting the high-cost ﬁrm’s price.
The ex ante expected proﬁtf o re a c hﬁrm is then µ(1 − µ)4. Second, we specify the contract that
elicits agent’s truthfulness. If agent i reports low cost and produces qi, then the agent receives
ti(qi,L)=θLqi +
(1−µ)4
2 , a n di fa g e n ti reports high cost and produces qi, then the agent receives
ti(qi,H)=θHqi. We now conﬁrm that agents’ incentive compatibility holds. Consider incentive
compatibility of a low-cost agent. Given that market shares in states (L,H), (H,L) and (H,H)





2, a low-cost agent is induced to be
truthful by the expected information rent
(1−µ)4
2 = 4·qi
H. Consider next incentive compatibility




H but suﬀer an increase of the expected production cost
4·qi
L. It follows that 4·qi
L ≥ 4·qi
H, since the monotonicity, qi
L ≥ qi
H, holds for any realization of
qi
LL under the mixed prices of two low-cost ﬁrms. We now ﬁn dt h ee xa n t ee x p e c t e dp r o ﬁto fe a c h
ﬁrm. The ex ante expected information rents are
µ(1−µ)4
2 , and thus the ex ante expected proﬁt,
n e to fs u c hi n f o r m a t i o nr e n t s ,i sπn ≡
µ(1−µ)4
2 . For the punishment phase in the repeated game
below, we deﬁne the set of Nash-equilibrium values as V n ≡ {(u1,u 2):u1 = u2 = v ≡ πn
1−δ}.
2.3. The Repeated Game
In this subsection, we describe the stage game and the repeated game. Our analysis hereafter
is based on the following assumptions: (i) ﬁrms do not exchange side-payments in the form of
monetary transfers across ﬁrms, (ii) agents across ﬁrms do not form a cartel to make collusive
reports using their side-payments and (iii) no ﬁrm secretly renegotiates the contract (collude)
with its agent. The model thus addresses a stringent environment for collusive side-contracting
14The ex post production in (H,H) is possible only if the contract is renegotiable; under ρ<C H, the ex ante




jk for relevant (j,k). The optimal renegotiation-
proof contract would be the contract oﬀered under ρ ≥ CH, and the associated suboptimal proﬁtw o u l db eρ−E(θ).
8behaviors. Note also that the contract with agent lasts for only one period.15
Consider the stage game. The timing of the stage game is as follows: (i) each agent i privately
observes its cost type θi ∈ {L,H}, (ii) each ﬁrm i oﬀers a single-period contract xi to each agent,
(iii) each agent i makes a report ri ∈ {L,H} to the ﬁrm, (iv) each ﬁrm i makes an announcement
ai ∈ {L,H} to its rival ﬁrm j 6= i, (v) each ﬁrm i chooses a price pi and makes a market-share
proposal qi and (vi) each agent i produces the quantity requested by the ﬁrm. Market shares are
realized and the contracts are enforced.
The stage game is designed to reﬂect an environment in which equally priced ﬁrms, subsequent
to the agents’ report, communicate with each other to allocate market shares in a state-dependent
way, and each agent, following ﬁrms’ selection of market allocations, produces the corresponding
quantity (market share). Each agent i observes θi ∈ {L,H} and reports ri ∈ {L,H} under a
contract xi. Each ﬁrm then announces ai ∈ {L,H} and sets price pi and makes market-share
proposal qi. Given that each agent accepts the contract, the vectors, p ≡ (p1,p 2) and q ≡ (q1,q2),
jointly determine market share for ﬁrm i, mi. If pi >ρ ,then mi =0 , and if pi <p j ≤ ρ, then
mi =1 . If p1 = p2 ≤ ρ, then mi = 1
2 if q1+q2 6=1 , and mi = qi otherwise. We can ﬁnd that market-
share proposals matter only for equally priced ﬁrms; if prices are diﬀerent, then the lowest-priced
ﬁrm captures the entire market for a relevant price range.
To simplify the exposition, we now follow two steps: we ﬁrst describe the inter-ﬁrm game for a
given internal contract xi, and then describe the contract. Then, in the interim stage that follows
the agent’s report ri ∈ {L,H}, ﬁrm i has a ﬁnite strategy set:16
Si =
©








e qi | e qi : {L,H}×{ L,H} → Q
ª
.
Announcement function, e ai, is conditional on the agent i’s report, and pricing and market-share
functions, e pi and e qi, are conditional on the agent i’s report and its rival’s announcement. A typical







, e pi ¡
ri,a j¢
, e qi ¡
ri,a j¢ª
.
The associated vector is denoted by s(r) ≡ (s1(r1,a 2),s 2(r2,a 1)), where r is the vector of the





, where πi(s,r) represents the realized proﬁt given the strategies. An ex ante expected






15An example of such environment might be the one in which agents play a one-shot game when each ﬁrm, having
replaceable potential agents, can easily detect side-contracting behaviors. It is beyond the scope of the present paper
to analyze a contracting scheme when each agent has future prospects in various multi-period contractual relationships.
In the extension section, however, we will present the case in which agents have future prospects.
16Note that it is not ensured for now that agents make truthful report (r
i = θ




9Consider the repeated game. For solution concept, we employ Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE),
where strategies are conditional on the publicly observed history of realized choices (Fudenberg et
al., 1994). Upon entering a period, each ﬁrm publicly observes the realized choices. Each ﬁrm also
privately observes its current cost type, the history of the cost types it had and the choice functions
it used in previous periods. Thus, a ﬁrm does not observe its rival ﬁrm’s current or past cost types
and does not observe its rival ﬁrm’s current or past choice functions. Let a ≡ (a1,a 2) represent the
vectors of ﬁrm announcements. Upon entering a period τ,e a c hﬁrm observes the public history of
realized choices, hτ = {at,pt,qt}τ−1
t=1 and h1 = ∅. As t r a t e g yo fﬁrm i in period τ, denoted by σi
τ,
is a mapping from the set of potential public histories Hτ to the set of stage-game strategies Si.
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle in each period τ is then deﬁned by στ ≡ (σ1
τ,σ2
τ). Each history hτ provides the
per-period expected payoﬀ Π
i(στ(hτ)). Each strategy involves a probability distribution, and thus




We ﬁnally describe the contract xi. As in most of the existing literature that studies a strategic
device of contract, we assume that contracts are observed by colluding ﬁrms.17 Ao n e - p e r i o d
contract is chosen from a set of payment schemes, xi ∈ {e ti | e ti : {L,H}×Q → R}. A typical
payment for agent i is denoted by ti(qi,ri) when agent i makes a report of ri ∈ {L,H} and produces
qi. This quantity qi is conditional on the two ﬁrms’ announcement, qi : {L,H}×{ L,H} → Q.
In this paper, we restrict attention to the contracts in which compensations to agents are at least
as high as production costs, ti(qi,L) ≥ θLqi and ti(qi,H) ≥ θHqi, which ensures that each agent
produces the requested quantity if the agent accepts any one-period contract.
In an ideal collusive scheme, ﬁrms would communicate with each other to allocate market shares
by the criterion of productive eﬃciency, whereby all production is assigned to the agent(s) with the
lowest production cost. Because of the two-tier communication channels, such market-allocation
collusions may pose a challenging problem in regard to ﬁnding enforceable contracts. For example,




= θLqi + 4·qi
H and ti(qi,H)=θHqi.
In this payment scheme, although the term qi on the RHS is conditional on the two ﬁrms’ announce-
ments, it is the “actual” quantity that agent i produces, and thus is veriﬁable. The information-rent
term 4·qi
H is, however, determined by the expected quantity that agent i would produce if the
agent reported high cost. This quantity is not conditional on the agent’s current cost type (low
cost) and associated production. Hence, the payment ti(qi,L) ∀i is veriﬁable only if low-cost agents
a r ea b l et ov e r i f yw h a tw o u l db et h e market-allocation schemes in (H,L), (L,H) and (H,H). In
this sense, the notation ti(qi,ri) is overly simpliﬁed. Another problem with ﬁnding enforceable
contracts is that agents may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to verify whether ﬁrms truthfully announce what they
have reported. If ﬁrms have an incentive to falsify the agents’ reported information, it may not
17In a recent study of strategic delegation, Kockesen and Ok (2004) show that even unobservable contracts may serve
as a commitment device.
10be ensured that agents make truthful reports of their cost types. Complication thus arises; the
payment to an agent (ti) is determined by the agent’s report (ri) and the ﬁrms’ market-allocation
schemes that are conditional on ﬁrms’ external announcements (ai and aj). For now, we simply
avoid these diﬃculties by making the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Each agent is able to verify both ﬁrms’ announcements and their market-allocation
schedules.
This assumption is very restrictive. However, after we ﬁnd a payment scheme that is enforceable
only under the assumption, we will establish an alternative scheme that is enforceable in the absence
of Assumption 1. In the alternative scheme, the payment to agent i will be dependent solely on
the real quantity qi that the agent produces. With this in mind, we use the notation ti(qi,ri) for
now, despite its oversimpliﬁcation.
2.4. Two-Tier Mechanism Design
In this subsection, we describe how the repeated game and internal contract are pulled together. A
major diﬃculty with ﬁnding an optimal collusion is to establish a two-tier revelation mechanism:
ri = θi (agent i’s truthful report to ﬁrm i)a n dai = ri (ﬁrm i’s truthful announcement to ﬁrm
j 6= i). Our approach involves two steps. Broadly speaking, in Step 1, we assume that each ﬁrm
knows its agent’s type for a given contract, and ﬁnd collusive market-share schedules, and in Step 2,
we ﬁnd an internal contract such that market-share allocation achieves productive eﬃciency. This
subsection is organized as follows. We ﬁrst describe Step 1 and introduce a dynamic programming
tool developed by Abreu et al. (1986, 1990). Following this tool, each ﬁrm’s PPE payoﬀ is factored
into two components, current-period proﬁt and (discounted) expected continuation values that are
conditional on current-period actions, and after any history, the set of continuation values is equal
to the equilibrium-value set. We next follow Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004),
who show that existing tools from (static) mechanism design theory can be used to ﬁnd the solution
of the factored program. We ﬁnally establish a two-tier mechanism design program.
Step 1 (Factored Program): Assume that for a given contract, each ﬁrm knows its agent’s cost
type (or equivalently each agent makes truthful report (ri = θi)). The program chooses current-



















b si(θi,e aj(θj)),s j(θj,b ai(θi))
¢¤
.
Note that continuation-value function υ is conditional on two ﬁrms’ announcement and current-
period strategies (p,q).
11We next adopt the work by Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004), who show that
the self-generating set (in the spirit of Abreu et al.) can be found by using existing tools from the
(static) mechanism design literature. Let the vector z ≡ (p,q,v) represent the equilibrium-path
strategy vector for prices, quantities and continuation values. To ﬁnd the equilibrium-path payoﬀs,
suppose that ﬁrm 1 announces cost type ˆ  when it knows that its agent draws cost type j, and that
if (ˆ ,k) is realized as a result of the stage game, then the ﬁrm receives the current-period payoﬀ
π1(p1
ˆ k,q1
ˆ k,j) and continuation value v1
ˆ k. It then follows that if ﬁrm 1, knowing that its agent’s cost
type is j, announces cost type ˆ , then it receives the interim current-period payoﬀ and continuation
value:











We express the equilibrium-path interim payoﬀ for ﬁrm i i na“ d i r e c t ”f o r m :Πi (ˆ ,j)+δvi
ˆ .
Two-Tier Program:
Step 1 (Mechanism Design Program): Assume that for a given contract, each ﬁrm knows its
agent’s cost type (each agent makes truthful report (ri = θi)). The program chooses current-period
strategies (p,q):{L,H}×{ L,H} → R4 and continuation-value function v : {L,H}×{ L,H}×










(i) On-Schedule Constraints: ∀ˆ  6= j, vi
ˆ k ∈ co(V ),
Πi (j,j)+δvi
j ≥ Πi (ˆ ,j)+δvi
ˆ . (On-ICi
j)
(ii) Oﬀ-Schedule Constraints: ∀(c pjk, c qjk) / ∈ {(pi
jk,qi







jk ≥ πi (c pjk, c qjk,j)+δb v. (Oﬀ-ICi
jk)
(iii) Oﬀ-Schedule Constraints: ∀(c pˆ k, c qˆ k) / ∈ {(p1
jk,q1











The constraint Oﬀ-m-IC2 is analogous.
Step 2 (Choice of Contract): Letting ui(z(xi)) represent the ex ante expected payoﬀ under a
contract xi, we ﬁnd a contract xi that satisﬁes
(i) Agent’s Truthful Reports: ri = θi.
(ii) Optimality Condition: for any alternative contract b x, ui(z(xi)) ≥ ui(z(b x)).
The mechanism design program chooses current-period strategies (p,q) conditional on two ﬁrms’
announcement, and chooses continuation-value function v conditional on two ﬁrms’ announcement
12and current-period (p,q). The vector z ≡ (p,q,v) is chosen to satisfy feasibility and incentive-
compatibility constraints. Feasibility constraint means that continuation values are drawn from
the equilibrium-value set. Incentive compatibility consists of two parts: (i) the “on-schedule”
(truth-telling) incentive compatibility that each ﬁrm truthfully announces its cost and (ii) the “oﬀ-
schedule” (non-deviating) incentive compatibility that each ﬁrm cannot gain by choosing a price
or market share that is not speciﬁed for any cost type. An on-schedule deviation is not detected
as a deviation to the rival ﬁrm, since it follows the equilibrium vector, whereas an oﬀ-schedule
deviation is observed. The repeated play of the (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium is always an
equilibrium of the repeated game; thus, when ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient, the Nash reversion can
be used as the punishment that follows any oﬀ-schedule deviation.
There are two types of oﬀ-schedule deviations: (i) a deviation from the vector (p,q) after the
announcement (Oﬀ-ICi
jk), and (ii) a “misrepresentation” at the announcement and a subsequent
deviation from the vector (Oﬀ-m-ICi
j).18 The ﬁrst type of deviation is realized by a ﬁrm that
slightly undercuts the price (say, c pjk = pi
jk − ε) and captures the entire market (c qjk =1 )a f t e rt h e
announcement (j,k). The second type of deviation is realized by a ﬁrm that misrepresents its type,
aiming to undercut the price subsequently. For example, if the price at the announcement (ˆ ,k),
pˆ k, is higher than in other announcements, then ﬁrm 1, knowing that its agent’s type is j, may be
tempted to announce ˆ  6= j, aiming to undercut the high price (c pˆ k = pˆ k − ε). In the section that
follows, we will argue that the second type of deviation can be ignored at a price-ﬁxing collusion.
In Step 1, we adopt the work by Athey and Bagwell (2001), whereby the PPE-value set in the
Factored Program (say, it is V ∗) can be equally established by vectors z =( p,q,v) that satisfy
feasibility and incentive-compatibility constraints in the Mechanism Design Program.19 To be







j hold, and (v1
jk,v2
jk) ∈ co(V ) ∀i,j,(j,k)
ª
.
Athey and Bagwell show that a value set, generated by these vectors, together with the punishment-
value set (V n) is equal to the PPE-value set:
©¡
u1,u 2¢
: ∃z ∈ ZIC(V )
ª
∪ V n = V ∗.
This means that for any PPE values (u1,u 2) ∈ V, there exists z ∈ ZIC(V ) such that ui = ui(z).
In Step 2, we build on this result and select a contract xi that induces the agent’s truthfulness
and maximizes the expected proﬁt. In the following section, we will argue that the role of contract
is not only a mechanism for agents’ truthfulness but also a strategic device for an optimal collusion.
18The on-schedule constraints imply that ﬁrms in the announcement stage are truthful along the equilibrium-
path (incentive compatible) vector z. Hence, a ﬁrm lies at the announcement stage only for a subsequent oﬀ-schedule
deviation.
19See Lemma 2 in their paper.
133. Incentive Compatibility with Contract
In this section, we demonstrate that there is an interaction between contractual form for agents’
truthfulness and incentive-compatibility constraints for ﬁrms. Among other alternatives, we con-
sider a contract that is enforceable only under Assumption 1: when agent 1 reports low cost and




= θLq1 + 4·q1
H, (5)
and when agent 1 reports high cost and produces q1, then the agent receives
t1(q1,H)=
(
θHq1 if q1 = q1
Hk
θHq1 + α(ρ − θH)(q1
L − q1
H) if q1 = q1
Lk,
(6)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The contract for agent 2 is analogous.
Note that the compensation to agent i is conditional on the actual quantity qi that agent i
produces and other expected quantities, qi
H and qi
L − qi
H, that are not conditional on the agent’s
current report of cost type. Given that market-share allocations are monotone (qi
L > qi
H), this
contract contains a commitment device that induces the ﬁrm’s truthfulness: when a high-cost agent
produces a large quantity that is assigned for a low-cost agent, the agent receives an extra payment.
If an agent reports high cost but the ﬁrm lies and announces low cost (understates) to increase its
market share, then the ﬁrm will have the expected gain (ρ − θH)(qi
L −qi
H) but suﬀer the expected
expense α(ρ − θH)(qi
L − qi
H). The contractual form for agent i seen in (5) and (6) is hereafter
denoted by xi(α).20 The level of α is used to represent a contractual parameter that captures how
strongly ﬁrms are bounded to truthfulness by the contractual form xi(α). In the previous literature,
ﬁrms own private information; they can observe and distort private information at no extra costs.
In our model, agents hold private information and ﬁrms deliver it following the agents’ report.
Having an incentive to distort the agents’ private information, ﬁrms use the internal contract and
endogenize the level of costs a high-cost ﬁrm suﬀers when it falsiﬁes its agent’s report. The level of
α reﬂects the level of costs that a high-cost ﬁrm incurs to falsify its agent’s report. The contractual
arrangement captures the circumstance in which ﬁrms deliberately reduce the degree to which they
control of private information; their incentive to distort the agents’ private information is bounded
by the contract with agents.21
20The qualitative results would be unaﬀected by a diﬀerent commitment device, t
i(q
i;H)=θHq
i + α, where
α>0 if ﬁrm i lies, and zero otherwise. Our analysis also does not resort to an immediate solution, where α
is a very large number, in order to show that a contract of this nature can be easily modiﬁed to a more realistic contract
in later analysis.
21In relation to the previous literature, our analysis can be extended to the model in which ﬁrms hold private
information but face some costs to distort it; a higher level of falsiﬁcation costs may reﬂect a lower degree of
private information. A similar falsiﬁcation cost is found in the principal-agent model by Maggi and Rodríguez-
Clare (1995), where the agent can distort its private information at some costs.
14The contract xi(α) has important features under the monotonicity, qi
L > qi
H. First, the contract
has a direct commitment eﬀect and yet is enforceable only under Assumption 1. Second, the two-
tier revelation problems are closely intertwined: agents’ truthful reports are ensured if and only if
ﬁrms do not lie. If ﬁrms are truthful, then agents are truthful under the contract. If high-cost ﬁrms
do lie (understate the reported cost types), then low-cost agents have an incentive to overstate their
cost types. If a low-cost agent i lies and reports high cost and ﬁrm i understates it, then the agent
receives ti(qi,H)=θHqi + α(ρ − θH)(qi
L − qi




H + α(ρ − θH)(qi
L − qi
H) > 0.
The low-cost agent who lies can get the expected cost saving in production (ﬁrst term) but lose the
information rents (second term) that the agent could earn without overstatement. The ﬁrst two
terms cancel each other out. Third, if ﬁrms are truthful, then they can optimally allocate market
shares by the criterion of productive eﬃciency, which enhances contractual eﬃciency; ﬁrms can
reduce information rents by mitigating the low-cost agent’s incentive to overstate the cost type.
Information rents will be realized for two low-cost agents in (L,L), and for one low-cost agent in
(H,L) or (L,H). Letting Ii ≡ 4·qi
H, the overall expected information rents will be the same as
in the optimal monopoly contracting:
µ2(I1 + I2)+µ(1 − µ)(I1 + I2)=µ(1 − µ)4·(q1
HH + q2
HH).
At this point, it is worthwhile to present an overview of how the contract acts as a commitment
device in later analysis. First, we will establish a Pareto-frontier line segment of APPE values.
Construction of the line segment is possible only when the segment is suﬃciently long, so that a
high-cost ﬁrm is persuaded to be truthful today by a suﬃciently high continuation value drawn
within the segment even if the ﬁrm may end up with zero market share. If the contract xi(α) is
selected such that a high-cost ﬁrm suﬀers some falsiﬁcation costs when it lies, then the high-cost
ﬁrm can be induced to be honest today by a reduced continuation-value reward, which relaxes the
restriction that the segment must be suﬃciently long. In this way, the internal contract acts as
a commitment device that elicits the ﬁrm’s truthfulness. Second, we will characterize an optimal
SPPE, wherein to prevent the high-cost ﬁrm’s understatement today, a low continuation value (as
future penalty) is given to the ﬁrms that report low cost together. If the contract xi(α) is selected
such that a high-cost ﬁrm gains nothing by telling a lie today (because α is high enough) today,
then it becomes unnecessary to penalize the ﬁrms that report low cost together tomorrow. The
contract then acts to avoid the equilibrium-path penalization that would otherwise follow a pair
of low-cost announcement.
We now fully express incentive-compatibility constraints for a given contract xi(α). Suppose
that prices are ﬁxed at ρ, and market-share schedules are monotone, qi
L > qi
H. Both conditions
hold in equilibrium. If the internal contract has a commitment device as in (5) and (6), then the



















To represent the interim-stage proﬁts in a direct form, let Ui(ˆ ,j) ≡ Πi (ˆ ,j)+δvi
ˆ .22 The on-
schedule constraints are then given by
Ui(H,H) ≥ Ui(L,H) (On-ICi
H)
Ui(L,L) ≥ Ui(H,L). (On-ICi
L)
Our analysis focuses on the binding downward incentive constraint (On-ICi
H) ,b a s e do nt h ef o l l o w -
ing Lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that prices are ﬁxed at ρ and that qi
L > qi
H. Under a contract xi(α), if On-IC i
H
is binding, then On-IC i
L is slack.
The proof is in the Appendix. The binding On-ICi
H is assumed, given that a high-cost ﬁrm
has an incentive to mimic a low-cost type that has a higher market share. The relevant incentive
problem is how to dissuade a high-cost ﬁrm from mimicking a low-cost type.23
We next ﬁnd the expected proﬁtf u n c t i o nw h e nO n - I C i
H is binding. Under a contract xi(α), if
ah i g h - c o s tﬁrm is truthful, then it earns
Ui(H,H)=Πi(H,H)+δvi
H,
and if a high-cost ﬁrm lies, then it earns




















H thus indicates the balance between the expected current-period gain from
understatement (RHS) and the expected continuation-value loss that a ﬁrm will suﬀer from telling














22All the interim-stage proﬁts are provided by the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
23As will be seen below, there is a constraint that a Pareto-frontier line segment must be suﬃciently long for
it to exist. The assumption that On-IC
i
H is binding provides the minimum length of the segment that satisﬁes
this constraint.
16It is immediate to derive this equation from Ui(H,H)=Ui(L,H). The second term on the RHS
represents information rents, and the last term is the extra costs that a high-cost ﬁrm will incur
when it lies. Thus, for a given contract xi(α), if On-ICi
H is binding, then the expected equilibrium
payoﬀ, ui(z(α)) =
P
j µjUi (j,j), is given by















As mentioned above, there are two types of oﬀ-schedule deviations: (i) a ﬁrm can slightly
undercut the price and capture the entire market after the communication with the other ﬁrm,
and (ii) a ﬁrm can overstate or understate at the communication and then undercut the price. No



























The Nash-equilibrium value, denoted by v, is used as the punishment that follows any oﬀ-schedule
deviation. The RHS represents the current-period gain that ﬁrm i can have by undercutting
slightly the price ρ in state (j,k), whereas the LHS represents the loss that ﬁrm i will suﬀer in the
future. Note that ρ − θj is the highest current-period payoﬀ that ﬁrm i of type j can get for any
payment scheme ti(qi,j) ≥ θjqi. We can show that since a misrepresentation has no cost savings
in terms of payments to the agent under xi(α), the constraint for the second deviation (Oﬀ-m-ICi
j)
is redundant in a price-ﬁxing collusion; Oﬀ-m-ICi
j holds whenever other constraints are satisﬁed.
For instance, consider Oﬀ-m-IC1














µk [(ρ − θL)+δv].
The RHS represents the highest expected payoﬀ that a low-cost ﬁrm can get when it misrepresents
its cost type for a subsequent deviation. The inequality is given by Oﬀ-IC1
Lk.
4. Optimal APPE
In this section, we establish the existence of an optimal APPE as follows. In regard to the existence,
we show that a contract xi(α) can be designed such that there exists a value set V (α) generated
by incentive compatible vectors z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) under the contract:
V (α)=
©
(u1,u 2):∃z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) such that ui = ui(z(α)) ∀i
ª
.
Agents’ truthful reports are ensured under xi(α) by ﬁrms’ incentive compatibility under z(α).
In regard to the optimality, given that a contract xi(α) provides a value set V (α), we choose
the contract such that values in V (α) achieve the optimal monopoly values: V (α) ⊂ V m, where
V m ≡ {(u1,u 2):u1 + u2 = πm
1−δ}. Then, we say that there exists a set V (α) ⊂ V m such that
V (α) ∪ V n is a self-generating set of PPE values. For the base model, we preserve Assumption 1
together with the assumption, µ>1
2. These assumptions will be relaxed.
174.1. Contractual Range
T oe s t a b l i s ha no p t i m a lA P P E - v a l u es e tV (α), we ﬁnd a contract xi(α) (a range of α in (6)),
wherein for any (u1,u 2) ∈ V (α), there exists a vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) such that ui = ui(z(α))
∀i. Since the set V m has slope du2
du1 = −1, any optimal value set V (α) ⊂ V m is a line segment with
slope −1. The line segment is deﬁned as V (α)=[ ( u,u),(u,u)], where u>uand u + u = πm
1−δ. As
is standard, we ﬁrst explore only the on-schedule constraints, assuming that ﬁrms are suﬃciently
p a t i e n ts ot h a to ﬀ-schedule constraints hold.
Consider ﬁrst the parameter range ρ ≥ CH ≡ θH +
µ
1−µ4 in which q1
HH + q2
HH =1in an
optimal collusion, as seen in Lemma 1. It follows from the optimality that price is ﬁxed at ρ, and
market shares in states (L,H) and (H,L) are ﬁxed at q1
LH = q2
HL =1 . Each point in V (α) is
therefore established by varying market shares in ties, qi
LL and qi
HH. At an endpoint (u,u) of the
line segment V (α), for example, ﬁrm 1 receives the smallest value u by being assigned to the least
favored market shares such that q1
LL and q1
HH are close or equal to zero. Attention is thus on how
to elicit a ﬁrm’s truthfulness at its “disadvantaged” position, where the ﬁrm draws high cost and
thus may have zero market share. A high continuation value v1
HL (as future reward) is aﬀorded to
ﬁrm 1, in order to induce its truthfulness today at the least favored endpoint. The level of such





(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (9)
















The equation (9) implies that if a line segment V (α) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently
long: the value u must exceed u by at least the RHS of (9).25 Only then is it feasible to reward a
high-cost ﬁrm with a high continuation value v1
HL drawn from the segment. Thus, the on-schedule
constraints imply that there is an “additional” constraint:
u − u ≥
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
We now establish that there exists a vector z(α) that satisﬁes the binding On-ICi
H and Add-IC if
for any δ,
α ≥ α∗(δ) ≡
1 − δ + δ(2µ − 1)(1 − µγ)
1 − δ + δ2µ2 ,
where γ represents the ratio
4
ρ−θH.
To clarify the exposition, consider the case where α = α∗(δ) for any δ.26 Deﬁne a vector z(α)
24The derivation of (9) is included in the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
25The length given by the RHS of (9) satisﬁes the required length for the segment to exist. If On-IC
i
H is not
binding (say, slack), then the width on the RHS is not long enough.
26In the Appendix, we show that for any α ≥ α
∗(δ) for a given δ, there exist z(α) ∈ Z
IC(V (α)) that establishes
18such that (i) prices are ﬁxed at ρ, (ii) market shares are allocated by the criterion of productive
eﬃciency with q1
LL = q1






(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
= u +
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
v1




(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
,
together with the condition, v1
ij+v2
ij = u+u ∀(j,k). Given the price and productive eﬃciencies, this
vector z(α) achieves optimality. To see this, using the equilibrium payoﬀ in (8), let u1(z(α)) = u















Note that u decreases in α whereas u increases in α, and that ∀α







The deﬁned vector indicates that ﬁrm 1, at the end point (u,u), receives the least favored market
shares in ties, and produces zero output in (H,L). Given the vector, the binding On-ICi
H in (9)
implies that ﬁrm 1 receives a high continuation value v1
HL = u+
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
δ . This continuation-value
reward will be delivered when ﬁrm 1 takes more favored market shares in ties in the future after
the realization of (H,L). We conﬁrm that this vector z(α) is (on-schedule) incentive compatible.
The value v1
LL is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC1
H, and the value v1
HL is chosen to satisfy
the equation (10), given the other values. Because of the binding On-IC1
H and the equation (10),
On-IC2
H is also binding. It follows from Lemma 2 that ∀i if On-ICi
H is binding, then On-ICi
L is
slack. We still need to conﬁrm that Add-IC holds. The level of α = α∗(δ) is determined to satisfy
the binding Add-IC: u − u =
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
δ . Lastly, we verify that the continuations are drawn from
the value set [(u,u),(u,u)]. If Add-IC holds, then u <v 1
HL ≤ u, and if µ>1
2, then u <v 1
LL < u.27
Hence, vi
jk ∈ V (α) ∀i,(j,k).
We next construct the other endpoint (u,u) of V (α). If there exists an incentive compatible
vector z(α) that establishes an endpoint (u,u), then there exists an analogous vector z0(α) that
establishes the other endpoint (u,u). Then, the remainder of the segment can be constructed by
a convex combination of two vectors. The reason is that given the ﬁxed price ρ, ﬁrms’ payoﬀs
and the on-schedule constraints are linear in terms of market shares and continuation values, for a
given level of α.
We also emphasize that the contract xi(α) can be used to lengthen the width of V (α). Observe
that the gap u − u increases in α. To investigate how the equilibrium payoﬀ in (8) changes with
the end point (u, ¯ u). This result and the arguments that follow are detailed by the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
27Note that the assumption µ>
1
2 is necessary for the continuation values to be drawn from the value set V (α).
19α, suppose that α rises. Then, the payoﬀ of ﬁrm 2 (u) increases. The last term in (8) αµ(ρ −
θH)(q2
L−q2
H) rises with α, and this positive eﬀect is maximized, because of the most favored market
shares, q2
LL = q2
HH =1 , given the continuation values, v2
LH = v2
HH = u under z(α).28 When α rises,
however, the payoﬀ of ﬁrm 1 (u) falls. The positive eﬀect through the last term is minimized for ﬁrm
1, because of the least favored market shares, q1
LL = q1





δ falls, given v1
LH = u under z(α). To see how the width is lengthened,
consider an alternative contract xi(b α), where b α = b α(δ) >α ∗(δ) for any δ. The associated vector
z(b α) is deﬁned such that productive eﬃciency is achieved with q1
LL = q1
HH =0 , and continuation
values are similar to those in z(α) except that b α replaces α in v1
HL and v1
LL. W ec a nt h e nc o n s t r u c t
av a l u es e tV (b α) whose width is longer than that of V (α) under α = α∗(δ). Since the RHS of
Add-IC decreases in α, Add-IC is slack under the alternative contract.
Our argument can be summarized as follows. It is highly beneﬁcial that ﬁrms allocate market
shares by productive eﬃciency. Variations of continuation values are necessary to induce ﬁrms’
current-period truthfulness. These continuation-value transfers are delivered in the form of market-
s h a r ef a v o r si nt i e s( i nt e r m so ff a v o r e dl o c a t i on on the segment). Construction of the optimal
APPE-value set is possible only when the frontier of value set is long enough. The frontier can be
suﬃciently lengthened by the contractual device such that the least favored ﬁrm is persuaded to be
truthful by a continuation-value reward drawn from the segment. Given the recursive structure of
the model, any collusive scheme is designed to elicit ﬁrms’ truthfulness in each period, regardless
of their previous cost reports. Even after a history of 10 consecutive draws of (H,L), for example,
ﬁrm 1 is induced to be truthful today by the promise of the most favored market shares tomorrow,
if it is patient enough to endure asymmetric market-share arrangements in ties.29
Lemma 3. Assume that µ>1
2 and ρ ≥ CH, and that ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. If α ≥ α∗(δ),
there exists a set
V (α)=
©
(u1,u 2):∃z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) such that ui = ui(z(α)) ∀i
ª
⊂ V m.
A detailed proof is provided in the Appendix. An example of the locus α = α∗ (δ) is in Fig. 1.
Note that α∗(δ) is decreasing in δ. If δ rises, the gap u−u rises but the RHS of Add-IC falls. Thus,
if δ is higher, then Add-IC may hold for a lower α. Intuitively, when ﬁrms are more patient and
thus more willing to wait for future reward than to capture the current-period gain by understating
their cost types, they may depend on a lower level of contractual commitment. Note also that the
level of α∗(δ) is decreasing in the ratio γ =
4
ρ−θH. Intuitively, when 4 is higher, high-cost ﬁrms
are more willing to wait for the continuation-value reward; when the continuation-value reward
is delivered in terms of market-share favors (e.g., qi
LL = qi
HH =1 ) , the payoﬀ will increase more














29If ﬁrms are not suﬃciently patient, some ineﬃciency begins to have an eﬀect on the APPE-value set as is
detailed by Athey and Bagwell (2001).
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Figure 1: Example of α = α∗(δ) and β = β∗(δ).
signiﬁcantly for a higher 4. Firms may then need a lower level of contractual commitment. On
the other hand, when the margin ρ−θH is higher, high-cost ﬁrms are more tempted to capture the
current-period gain, and thus their incentives should be more strongly bounded by the contract.
Consider next the parameter range ρ<C H in which q1
HH + q2
HH =0in an optimal collusion.








= θHqi + β (ρ − θH)qi, (14)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Ah i g h - c o s tﬁrm is assigned to zero output in an optimal collusion. Any positive
production is accomplished by either a low-cost ﬁrm or a high-cost ﬁrm that surely lies. If a high-
cost ﬁrm lies and ever produces qi > 0, it has gain (ρ − θH)qi but suﬀers costs β (ρ − θH)qi. Note





(1 − β)(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (15)
Thus, if a line segment V (β) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently long:
u − u ≥
(1 − β)(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
There is a vector z(β) that satisﬁes the binding On-ICi
H a n dA d d - I Ci ff o ra n yδ,
β ≥ β∗(δ) ≡ max
½
(2 − µ)(1− δ + µδ) − µ2δγ




Following the same arguments as above, we can obtain the following result.30
30The vector z(β) is detailed in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. Note that the assumption µ>
21Lemma 4. Assume that µ>3−
√
5
2 and ρ<C H, and that ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. If
β ≥ β∗(δ), there exists a set
V (β)=
©
(u1,u 2):∃z(β) ∈ ZIC(V (β)) such that ui = ui(z(β)) ∀i
ª
⊂ V m.
An example of β = β∗ (δ) is illustrated in Fig. 1. The level of β∗(δ) is decreasing in δ and
γ =
4
ρ−θH;a sa b o v e ,ﬁrms needs a lower level of contractual commitment when δ and γ are higher.
The inequality ρ<C H is rewritten as γ>
1−µ
µ . If γ is low and close to
1−µ
µ , then β∗(δ) is higher
than α∗(δ) for a given δ. If γ keeps rising, then β∗(δ) shifts down below α∗(δ). If γ is higher
than
2−µ
µ and if δ is suﬃciently high, then β∗ (δ)=0 . This ﬁnding implies that the contractual
commitment becomes unnecessary if γ and δ are suﬃciently high.
4.2. Optimal APPE with Assumption 1
As of yet, our analysis has been conﬁned to the on-schedule constraints. In this subsection, we
identify the critical discount factor δ∗ a b o v ew h i c ht h eo ﬀ-schedule constraints also hold. To ﬁnd
δ∗, we use the above vector z(α). It then suﬃces to check whether a ﬁrm’s oﬀ-constraints hold at
its disadvantaged endpoint, since the ﬁrm there is more tempted to undercut the price than at
any other point of the segment. Firm 1 is disadvantaged at the endpoint (u,u) and assigned to
q1
LL = q1
HH =0under z(α). In (L,H), ﬁrm 1 would not undercut the price, since it captures the
entire market in equilibrium. Comparing (H,L) to (H,H), ﬁrm 1 is less tempted to deviate in
(H,L) than in (H,H); the continuation value v1
HL is higher than v1






















HH =0under z(α), Oﬀ-IC1
LL is δ(v1
LL − v) ≥ ρ − θL. Hence, the oﬀ-schedule
constraints reduced to Oﬀ-IC1
LL and Oﬀ-IC1












≥ ρ − θL (Oﬀ-IC1
LL)
δ (u − v) ≥ ρ − θH. (Oﬀ-IC1
HH)
By plugging α = α∗(δ) and u in (11) and (12) into the constraints, we can ﬁnd the associated
critical discount factors, δ∗
LL and δ∗
HH. Then, δ∗ =m a x{δ∗
LL,δ∗
HH}.
Example. Suppose that ρ =4 ,θ H =2 ,θ L =1and µ =0 .6. Consider ﬁrst the on-schedule
constraints. A contract xi(α) can be designed to establish the existence of a value set V (α)=
[(u,u),(u,u)] ⊂ V m. If V (α) exists, then the on-schedule constraints imply that the width of V (α)
1




2 ≈ 0.382. As above, this assumption is necessary for v
1
LL to be drawn from V (β).
22must be long enough (Add-IC): u−u ≥
2(1−α)
δ . The endpoint (u,u) can be constructed by a vector
z(α) in which productive eﬃciency is achieved with q1
LL = q1
HH =0 , and continuation values are






















Note that u + u = 2.6
1−δ = πm
1−δ. All the on-schedule constraints are satisﬁed: On-ICi
H is binding,
On-ICi
L is slack and Add-IC is binding if α = α∗(δ)=1−0.86δ
1−0.28δ. Consider next the oﬀ-schedule














Using the values v1
LL and v1
HH under z(α) and α = α∗(δ), we ﬁnd that δ∗
LL ≈ 0.729 and δ∗
HH ≈
0.678. Thus, δ∗ =m a x{δ∗
LL,δ∗
HH} ≈ 0.729. This example highlights that V (α) ⊂ V m exists even
if ﬁrms are not inﬁnitely patient: if δ =0 .8 >δ ∗, then α∗(δ) ≈ 0.402,u≈ 5.753 and u ≈ 7.247.
As argued above, the contract xi(α) c a nb eu s e dt ol e n g t h e nt h ew i d t ho fV (α). Under an
alternative contract xi(b α), if b α = b α(δ) >α ∗(δ) for any δ, then there exists a vector z(b α) in which
productive eﬃciency is achieved with q1
LL = q1
HH =0 , and continuation values are assigned as in
z(α) except that b α replaces α in continuation values. The width of the associated value set V (b α) is
longer than that of V (α) under α = α∗(δ). Add-IC becomes slack under the alternative contract.
Note, however, that the values, v1
LL and v1
HH, are lower under z(b α) than z(α), and thus lengthening
the value segment may be constrained by the oﬀ-schedule deviation of the least favored ﬁrm unless
δ is suﬃciently high.
By contrast, the alternative contract xi(b α) may be used to shorten the width of the value set.
Under the contract xi(b α), there exists a vector b z(b α) 6= z(b α) such that productive eﬃciency is
achieved with q1
LL = q1
HH ∈ (0, 1
2) while continuation values remain similar to those under z(b α). A
distinct feature here is that market shares of ﬁrm 1 in ties are above zero and Add-IC is binding;
the level of b α = b α(δ) and market shares in ties are tailored to satisfy the binding Add-IC.31 In
this case, the width of the corresponding set V (b α) i ss h o r t e rt h a nt h a to fV (α) under α = α∗(δ).
Note that the RHS of Oﬀ-IC1
LL and Oﬀ-IC1
HH decreases when q1
LL and q1
HH decrease, and that the
value u in the LHS rises when the segment is shortened. Thus, shortening the segment may relax
the oﬀ-schedule constraints of the least favored ﬁrm in some parameter range. We summarize our
ﬁndings as follows:
Proposition 1. Assume that ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. (i) If ρ ≥ CH and µ>1
2, then for
α ≥ α∗(δ), there exists a set V (α) ⊂ V m such that V (α) ∪ V n is a self-generating set of APPE
31It is shown by the proof of Lemma 3 that for any α ≥ α
∗(δ) for a given δ,there exists a vector z(α) in which On-IC
i
H
and Add-IC are binding.
23values. (ii) If ρ<C H and µ>3−
√
5
2 , then for β ≥ β∗(δ), there exists a set V (β) ⊂ V m such that
V (β) ∪ V n is a self-generating set of APPE values.
The proof is in the Appendix. The beneﬁt of the interaction between internal contracting and
inter-ﬁrm collusion is substantial. Even if ﬁrms are not inﬁnitely patient, they may be able to
duplicate the monopolist’s optimal performance. If the information that facilitates collusion is
held by other parties (agents), then the contract with agents may act as a commitment device
to relax the truth-telling constraint for colluding ﬁrms to allocate market shares by the criterion
of productive eﬃciency. Conversely, collusive market-share allocations may act to discipline the
agents’ overstating incentive and thus reduce their information rents. This ﬁnding is, however,
based on Assumption 1.
4.3. Optimal APPE without Assumption 1
In this subsection, we relax Assumption 1. In the previous analysis, the continuation-value reward
was delivered in the form of market-share favors in ties (or in terms of favored position on the
s e g m e n t ) ,a n dc o n s t r u c t i o no fa no p t i m a lA P P E - v alue set was possible, since market shares in
ties, qi
LL and qi
HH, varied along the equilibrium-value set without causing any ineﬃciency. The
market-sharing arrangements are, however, feasible only when they are veriﬁable for agents. Our
objective here is to ﬁnd a payment scheme ti(qi,j) that is conditional only on the real quantity qi
that agent i produces after the report of j. Ad i ﬃculty with ﬁnding such a payment scheme is that
the information-rent term for a low-cost agent, 4·qi
H, involves the market-sharing schemes that
the agent would face only after the report of high cost. Given this diﬃculty, we put a restriction
on market shares in ties: qi
HH is held constant at 1
2 and only qi
LL is used for market-share favors.
Using the restriction, we can construct a simple and enforceable contract. Assuming that ρ ≥ CH,













θHqi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1
2





if qi > 1
2.
(17)
Note that payments to agent i are conditional only on the actual output qi that the agent produces.
A low-cost agent receives a ﬁxed information rent, and a high-cost agent receives an extra payment
when the agent produces more than a ﬁxed output 1
2. Given the restriction qi
HH = 1
2, information
rent is ﬁxed at the minimal level, 4·qi
H =
(1−µ)4
2 , a n dp r o d u c t i o na b o v e1
2 is carried out by either a
low-cost ﬁrm or a high-cost ﬁrm that surely lies. If ﬁrms are truthful with the commitment device,
then agents also are truthful with the minimal information rent. The overall expected information
rent for both agents is the same as that in the optimal monopoly contract, µ(1 − µ)4.
Following the previous procedure, we can establish the existence of a value set V (α) ⊂ V m
24under the contract xi(α) if for any δ,
α ≥ α∗ (δ) ≡
1 − δ + δµ(1 − µγ)
1 − δ + δµ(1 + µ)
. (18)
As above, the contract xi(α) c a nb eu s e dt ol e n g t h e n( o rs h o r t e n )t h ew i d t ho fV (α). The scope
of market-sharing arrangements at (H,H) is reduced from [0,1] to 1
2. A tt h es a m et i m e ,h o w e v e r ,
the rigidity, qi
HH = 1
2, reduces the market-share disadvantage in ties. The assumption on µ is
necessary in order to make the continuation-value reward suﬃcient for a ﬁrm to be truthful at
its disadvantaged endpoint. The assumption is now relaxed to µ>1
3, as the rigidity reduces the
market-share disadvantage in ties.
Proposition 2. Assume that ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. If ρ ≥ CH and µ>1
3, then for
α ≥ α∗(δ) as in (18), there exists a set V (α) ⊂ V m such that V (α)∪V n is a self-generating set of
APPE values.
The proof is in the Appendix. In the parameter range ρ<C H, the result in Proposition 1 (ii)
remains without depending on Assumption 1. Any modiﬁcation of the contract xi(β) in (13) and
(14) is unnecessary, since the payments are conditional only on the real output qi.
In the previous literature, ﬁrms own private information; ﬁrms can observe and distort private
information at no extra costs. In our model, agents hold private information and ﬁrms deliver
it; ﬁrms deliberately reduce the degree to which they control of private information. A very
simple contractual arrangement that reduces the ﬁrms’ incentive to distort the agents’ private
information makes it possible to establish a suﬃciently long Pareto-frontier segment, so that ﬁrms
are induced to be truthful by continuation-value transfers. As a result, an interaction between
internal contracting and market-sharing collusion is exploited: ﬁrms achieve an optimal market
allocation, and the beneﬁt of the optimal market allocation is not limited to productive eﬃciency
but expanded to contractual eﬃciency. This argument becomes apparent in comparison with the
no-agent setting as in Athey and Bagwell (2001). To characterize ﬁrst-best collusion, Athey and
Bagwell restrict γ =
4
ρ−θH to be above a certain level. As argued above, when γ falls, the need for
the commitment device grows, and thus α∗(δ) rises. If this restriction fails in the no-agent model,
then ﬁrst-best proﬁt is approximated only when ﬁrms are inﬁnitely patient; as ﬁr m sb e c o m e sm o r e
patient, the width of Pareto-frontier segment grows, but not suﬃciently for δ<1. In this paper,
however, the width restriction on the equilibrium-value set is relaxed even if ﬁrms are moderately
patient.
5. Optimal SPPE
In the previous section, continuation-value transfers were used to construct an optimal APPE-value
set, and they were delivered in the form of asymmetric market shares in ties without sacriﬁcing
any eﬃciency; market shares in ties, qi
LL and qi
HH, are unrestricted (changeable) as in Proposition
251, and qi
LL is unrestricted and qi
HH is restricted to 1
2 as in Proposition 2. We now impose a stronger
restriction on market-shares in ties: both qi
LL and qi
HH are restricted to 1
2. This symmetry restriction
m a k e si ti m p o s s i b l et oe x c h a n g em a r k e t - s h a r ef avors in ties. In this section, to allow for the
symmetry restriction, we employ Symmetric Perfect Public Equilibrium (SPPE) and characterize
the features that would not be found in the no-agent model because of its symmetry restriction.
5.1. Symmetry Restriction
In this subsection, we study what symmetry means. Recall that a strategy of ﬁrm i in period τ is
a mapping from the set of potential public histories to the set of stage-game strategies. A typical
strategy of ﬁrm i in period τ is σi




τ(hτ) ∀i,j,τ,hτ. This means that stage-game strategies are symmetric
across ﬁrms for all histories. Among the stage-game strategies we have used, only strategies (p,q)
are aﬀected by the symmetry restriction in this section; we have considered symmetric contracts,
xi = xj, and ﬁrm announcements are truthful in both APPE and SPPE. Thus, when ρ ≥ CH, the
optimal symmetric vectors of prices and market shares are
∀i,(j,k),p i
jk = ρ, q1
LH = q2






Note that prices and market-share schedules are symmetric across ﬁrms.
Again, we use the previous two-tier mechanism design program to establish an SPPE-value set:
assuming the agents’ truthfulness, we ﬁnd current-period strategies (p,q) and continuation-value
function v that satisfy the on- and oﬀ-schedule constraints, and select a contract xi that induces
the agent’s truthfulness and achieves optimality. Let V s denote the set of SPPE continuation
values. The values in V s are restricted to the 45-degree line, and the Pareto-frontier value set of
SPPE is reduced to a point (b u, b u): V s ⊂
©
(u1,u 2):u1 = u2 ≤ b u
ª
.32 In SPPE, any continuation-
value reduction (below the Pareto-frontier value set) is suﬀered by all ﬁrms together. In APPE, by
contrast, a continuation-value loss for one ﬁrm may imply a continuation-value gain for another.
Thus, eﬃcient continuation-value transfers across ﬁrms are unavailable in SPPE.
To emphasize how the presence of privately-informed agents aﬀects the SPPE-value set V s(α),




















H is similarly given. The constraint shows that (i) if a vector (p,q,v) achieves price eﬃciency
(pjk = ρ) and Pareto-eﬃcient continuation values (vi
jk = b u), then it entails productive ineﬃciency
(qi
L = qi
H), and (ii) if the vector achieves productive eﬃciency and Pareto-eﬃcient continuation
32The value e u is the supremum of SPPE continuation values. We show below that the Pareto-frontier set of
SPPE values includes this supremum.
26values, then it entails price ineﬃciency (pjk <ρfor some (j,k)). These two cases occur in an
SPPE that is stationary,w h e r e i nﬁrms repeatedly use the same current-period strategies (p,q) to
satisfy all the constraints, ﬁxing continuation values at b u. Any SPPE that is nonstationary involves
variations of continuation values, which necessarily entails a reduction of some continuation values
below b u to satisfy On-ICi
H. Therefore, because of the intrinsic nature of SPPE that continuation-
value transfers are wasteful, optimal SPPE values are lower than the optimal monopoly values in
the no-agent model.33
Lemma 5. In the no-agent model, the Pareto-frontier SPPE values are lower than the optimal
monopoly values.
5.2. Optimal SPPE Values
The result in Lemma 5 seems fairly straightforward. However, it becomes far diﬀerent if each ﬁrm
has a privately-informed agent. In this subsection, we establish a nonstationary SPPE and show
that along with a simple contractual arrangement, the SPPE-value set V s(α) may approximate the
point: V m = {(u1,u 2):u1 = u2 = πm
2(1−δ)}. We construct an SPPE-value set V s(α)=[ ( u,u),(u,u)],
where u>u . This set has the two endpoints of SPPE values, (u,u) and (u,u), on the 45-degree
line. If ﬁrms randomize over the two vectors that construct the two endpoints, the SPPE-value set
becomes convex and fully characterized. We thus focus on the construction of the two endpoints.
To establish V s(α), we ﬁnd a contract xi(α), wherein for any (u1,u 2) ∈ V s(α), there exists a
vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V s(α)) such that ui = ui(z(α)) ∀i. We for now consider only the on-schedule




















2(1−µ) if qi > 1
2.
(21)
Note that payments to agent i are conditional only on the real output qi that the agent produces. A
low-cost agent receives a ﬁxed information rent, and a high-cost agent receives a ﬁxed extra payment
when the agent produces more than 1
2. Given the symmetry restriction qi
HH = 1
2, information rent
is ﬁxed at the minimal level, 4·qi
H =
(1−µ)4
2 , and production above 1
2 is carried out by either a
low-cost ﬁrm or a high-cost ﬁrm that surely lies. The high-cost ﬁrm that lies incurs falsiﬁcation
costs with probability of (1 − µ). If market shares follow the optimal symmetric vectors in (19),
33See Lemma 5 in Athey and Bagwell (2001) to ﬁnd how symmetry restricts the Pareto frontier.
34There are various forms of contract and associated vector z(α) that can establish a SPPE-value set V
s(α).
The qualitative result, however, would be unaﬀected: V
m c a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e db yV
s(α) along with a simple
contract x
i(α).











(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
2
.









(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
2
. (22)
We ﬁrst construct the higher SPPE-values (u,u). Deﬁne a symmetric vector z(α) such that
current-period strategies (p,q) are the vectors in (19) and continuation-value vector v is given by
v1
jk = v2
jk = u ∀(j,k), except
v1
LL = v2
LL = u −
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
2δµ
. (23)
The continuation value vi
LL is lower than other values and is chosen to satisfy the binding On-
ICi
H in (22). In SPPE, continuation-value transfers across ﬁrms are wasteful; any variation of
continuation values entails some ineﬃciency and is suﬀered by all ﬁrms together. The symmetric
vector z(α) uses a lower continuation value vi
LL (as future penalty) to prevent the high-cost ﬁrm’s
understatement today. This future penalty will be delivered subsequent to the realization of (L,L).
The equation (23) also implies that if an SPPE-value set V s(α) exists, then the distance between
t h et w oe n d p o i n t sm u s tb es u ﬃciently long (Add-IC): the value u must be greater than u at least
by
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
2δµ . Only then is it feasible to penalize low-cost ﬁrms with a low continuation value
vi
LL drawn from V s(α). Note that the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrm i takes the same form as (8), since
On-ICi
H is binding. Letting ui(z(α)) = u and using the vector z(α), we can ﬁnd the value:
u =
ρ − E (θ)
2
+ δu −
(1 − α)µ(ρ − θH)
2
. (24)
The third term on the RHS reﬂects the (discounted) potential future penalty that follows the
realization of (L,L).
We next construct the lower SPPE values (u,u). Deﬁne a vector z0(α) such that prices are ﬁxed
at a lower level, pi
jk = ρ <ρ∀i,(j,k), and market shares and continuation values, q and v, are the
same as in the previous vector z(α).35 Following the vector z0(α), ﬁrms deliver the future penalty
(a lower continuation value) by setting the lower price ρ after the realization of (L,L). With no
prior assumption that On-ICi






















35In order to construct the lower-value point, ﬁrms may use a productive ineﬃciency rather than a price reduction.
An advantage of choosing the price reduction is that it reduces the incentive to undercut the price at the lower-
value point.
28The last term represents the expected information rent under the contract. Letting ui(z0(α)) = u
and using the vector z0(α), we can ﬁnd the value:
u =
ρ − E (θ)
2
+ δu −
(1 − α)µ(ρ − θH)
2
. (25)
The lower value u captures the current-period price reduction (ﬁrst term) and the switch to the
higher value in the following period (second term) together with the potential future penalty




ρ = ρ −
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
µδ
. (26)
Note that ρ ≤ ρ for any α ∈ [0,1] with equality for α =1 . The binding Add-IC together with (24)
and (25) yields values:
u =
ρ − E (θ) − (1 − α)µ(ρ − θH)
2(1 − δ)
(27)
u = u −
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
2δµ
. (28)
As in the Appendix, the level of α is next chosen to ensure that the vectors z(α) and z0(α) satisfy
the on-schedule constraints.36 A certain level of α is necessary to prevent the low-cost ﬁrm from
overstating its cost type to avoid the potential future penalty.
We ﬁnally consider the oﬀ-schedule constraints. Since ﬁrms are more tempted to undercut the
price ρ than ρ, we focus on the ﬁrm 1’s oﬀ-schedule incentive at the endpoint (u,u). When ﬁrm
1 is a low-cost type, it will not undercut the price in (L,H) since it captures the entire market
in that state. When ﬁrm 1 is a high-cost type, it will be more tempted to undercut the price in
(H,L) than in (H,H), since the current-period market share q1
HL is lower than q1
HH for the same
continuation values, v1
HL = v1


















≥ (ρ − θH)q2
HL = ρ − θH. (Oﬀ-IC1
HL)
The oﬀ-schedule constraints of ﬁrm 2 are symmetrically described. The continuation values on
the LHS are v1
LL = u and v1
HL = u, and the RHS represents the current-period gain that ﬁrm 1
can make when it undercuts the price. Letting δ∗ =m a x {δ∗
LL,δ∗
HL}, we obtain the result that
corresponds to Lemma 3 in APPE: for some range of α and δ, there exist the two vectors that
can establish (u,u) and (u,u), respectively, and the remainder of V s(α) can be constructed by a
convex combination of the two vectors.
We now conclude that a simple contractual arrangement may signiﬁcantly change the SPPE-
value set V s(α). It is evident that if α → 1, then (i) ρ → ρ, (ii) u → u, (iii) u → πm
2(1−δ) and (iv) δ∗
36See the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
















In other words, if α → 1 and δ>δ ∗, then V s(α) → V m. We emphasize that the contract xi(α)
can be used to shorten the width of V s(α). When α → 1, wasteful continuation-value transfers
become unnecessary and the width of V s(α) is shortened to a point V m. Having an incentive to
distort the agents’ private information, ﬁrms use the contractual arrangement to increase the costs
ah i g h - c o s tﬁrm suﬀers when it falsiﬁes its agent’s report. The high-cost ﬁrm then gains nothing
by telling a lie today, and thus it becomes unnecessary to penalize the ﬁr m st h a tr e p o r tl o wc o s t
together. The contract thus acts to avoid the equilibrium-path penalization that would otherwise
follow a pair of low-cost announcement.
Proposition 3. Assume that ρ ≥ CH and that ﬁrms are suﬃciently patient. If α → 1, then an
SPPE can approximate the optimal monopoly proﬁt; if α → 1, then there exists a set V s(α) such
that (i) V s(α) ∪ V n is a self-generating set of SPPE values and (ii) V s(α) → V m.
The result is not based on the assumption µ>1
2, and the result for ρ<C H is analogous. Our
ﬁnding shows that a very simple contractual arrangement can shorten the SPPE-value set so that
ﬁrms are induced to be truthful without depending on wasteful continuation-value transfers. The
symmetry restriction in SPPE aﬀects characteristics of an optimal collusion diﬀerently between
our model and the no-agent model: SPPE suﬀers a waste of equilibrium values in the no-agent
model, but it can approximate the optimal monopoly proﬁt despite the symmetry restriction in
our model.
Our model also contrasts with the no-agent model by Athey et al. (2004), where cost types are
continuously distributed. They predict that when the distribution of cost types is log-concave, opti-
mal SPPE is characterized by a pooling equilibrium in which market shares are constant regardless
of cost types; ﬁrms sacriﬁce productive eﬃciency and instead save informational costs that would
be necessary to deter higher-cost ﬁrms from mimicking lower-cost ﬁrms. In our two-type model,
ﬁrms achieve productive eﬃciency in market allocation, which, in turn, reduces informational costs.
6. Extensions
In this section, we informally present some possible extensions of the model.37 First, we discuss
the role of communication between ﬁrms in comparison with other models. Second, we consider
internal contracting with agents who have future prospects.
37This section is motivated by referees’ reports.
306.1. Non-communicative Firms
T h er o l eo fc o m m u n i c a t i o ni nt h em o d e li st oa c h i e v es tate-dependent market-sharing arrangements.
Athey and Bagwell (2001) show that if observable past prices act as public history on which
subsequent collusion is coordinated, then ﬁrst-best proﬁt may be achieved without communication.
Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) ﬁnd, however, that the scope of collusion is constrained without
explicit communication when ﬁrms have imperfect public monitoring on past actions. A potential
beneﬁt of communication is also suggested in a large and growing private-monitoring literature.
It would be very complicated to keep track of each player’s belief over rival types as private
information is accumulated over time. Compte (1998) and Kandori and Matsushima (1998) show
that players can generate a public history, beneﬁting from communication.38
Returning to our model, we follow Athey and Bagwell (2001) and establish a non-communicative
APPE. Consider a price vector: p1
H = ρ, p1
L = ρ−2ε, p2
H = ρ−ε and p2
L = ρ−3ε for arbitrarily small
ε>0, where pi
j denotes price of ﬁrm i when its cost type is j. Note that prices and market shares
correspond to the vector that we used to construct the endpoint (u,u);p r o d u c t i v ee ﬃciency is
achieved, and market shares in ties are in favor of ﬁrm 2 in the Bertrand model. Since continuation
values can be contingent only on prices, communication is unnecessary. In this way, we can
directly use arguments by Athey and Bagwell without depending on their restriction on γ =
4
ρ−θH.39 Furthermore, we can establish a non-communicative SPPE that approximates the optimal
monopoly values. Prices can be deﬁned as pi
H = ρ and pi
L = ρ − ε to construct (u,u), and pi
H = ρ
and pi
L = ρ− ε to construct (u,u). Market shares are symmetric and achieve productive eﬃciency
in each endpoint, and continuation values can be contingent only on prices. Communication is
then unnecessary. A relative easiness of collusion in our model is still demonstrated in this non-
communicative collusion: no restriction on γ is necessary in APPE and no optimal values are
wasted in SPPE.
6.2. Non-myopic Agents
It has been assumed so far that the internal contract with agent lasts for only one period. The
contracting scheme is stationary; the same contract is repeatedly oﬀered over time. It is beyond the
scope of the present paper to analyze a contracting scheme when each agent has future prospects in
various multi-period contractual relationships. In the remainder of this section, we brieﬂyp r e s e n t
a possibility that colluding ﬁrms may beneﬁt when agents have future prospects; ﬁrms can use
agent’s future prospects to make the internal contract more eﬃcient. To this end, we construct
a self-generating set of agents’v a l u e s ,V A = {(uA,uA),(uA,u A)}, where uA >u A. When agent i
38Recent work shows that the Folk Theorem seems quite robust in games with private monitoring (without commu-
nication) within the class of prisoner’s dilemma model (e.g., Sekiguchi, 1997; Bhaskar and Obara, 2002; and
Ely and Välimäki, 2002).
39For detail, see their Proposition 8. Athey and Bagwell (2001) further address the circumstances where non-
communication beneﬁts colluding ﬁrms.
31observes cost type j and reports ˆ , the agent receives interim-stage payoﬀ,
UAi(ˆ ,j)=t
i
ˆ  − θjqi




ˆ  and wi
ˆ  represent the expected transfers and continuation values under the report ˆ :f o r













Observing that the agent has an incentive to overstate the cost type, we focus on the binding


















where δA represents agents’ common discount factor. An overstatement has current gain (RHS)
and future loss (LHS). When IC-Ai








L − (1 − µ)4·qi
H. (29)
As in the contract in (16) and (17), with a predetermined output qi











θHqi if 0 ≤ qi ≤ b qi
θHqi + α(ρ − θH)
¡
qi − b qi¢
if qi > b qi.
(31)
Since the contract becomes more eﬃcient only when agents’ information rents exist and become
lower, assuming ρ ≥ CH = θH+
µ
1−µ4, we deal with the case where productive eﬃciency is achieved
and productions in (H,H) are positive: b q1+b q2 =1 . In the previous analysis, information rents were
given by 4·qi
H =( 1−µ)4·b qi. A new constant term ψi ≥ 0 represents a reduction of information
rents for a low-cost agent i, and will be derived below. We ﬁrst construct a point (uA,u A) ∈ V A,

























Note that the point (uA,u A) is in favor of agent 1. Continuation values indicate that if agent
1 reports low cost (high cost) today, then the agent will preserve (lose) the current favored po-
sition tomorrow as future reward (penalty). To deliver continuation-value reward (penalty), a
non-stationary contracting schedule and market-sharing arrangements in (H,H) are employed as
follows. If agent 1 in its favored position reports low cost (high cost) today, the agent will receive
a favorable (unfavorable) contract and market share in (H,H) tomorrow. If any agent i (agent j)
is given the favored (disadvantaged) position today, then (i) qi
HH = b qi =1(q
j
HH = b qj =0 )so that




H, are slack as below.
32information rents 4·qi
H are maximized (minimized to zero), and (ii) the contract is oﬀered such
that the net surplus (1 − µ)4·b qi − ψi is positive (zero with ψj =0 ).
At the point (uA,u A), ﬁrm 1 has a market-share favor in (H,H),q 1
HH =1 . We now greatly
simplify our analysis and focus only on the agents’ constraints by neutralizing any ﬁrm’s relative
beneﬁt from market-sharing arrangements. To this end, we ﬁnd a disadvantaged market share for
ﬁrm 1 in (L,L),q 1
LL ∈ (0, 1
2), that exactly oﬀsets ﬁrm 1’s beneﬁti n(H,H). Under productive
eﬃciency, if µ is not too low, then there always exists q1
LL ∈ (0, 1
2) in which the ﬁrm 1’s gain (ﬁrm
2’s loss) in (H,H) is equal to its loss (its gain) in (L,L) in terms of the expected proﬁt.41 Along
with such market shares in ties, we set α =1in xi(α). In this case, the expected proﬁts are the
same across ﬁr m si ne a c hp e r i o d ,ﬁrms’ continuation values are drawn from the same value and
their on-schedule constraints are trivially satisﬁed.
Returning to the above history-dependent contracting schedule and continuation values, we can
rewrite the binding IC-A1
L:
δ(uA − uA)=θLq1
L + ∆ · q1
H − t
1
L = ψ1. (32)
The second equality is given by (30). We can easily ﬁnd that IC-A2
L has zero in both sides. Hence,
the “additional” constraint (Add-IC for agents’ constraints) is simply reduced to IC-A1
L.42 Using
the expected payoﬀ in (29) and letting uA1 = uA and uA2 = uA, we can ﬁnd the values, uA and
uA, and the diﬀerential:





























L + ∆ · q1
H −
δAµ
1 − δA(1 − µ)
∆ · q1
H.









A(1−µ) → 1 and so t
1
L → θLq1
L. Given that q1
HH = b q1 =1and that ψ1
is used to denote the information-rent reduction, we can deﬁne the last term as:
δAµ(1 − µ)∆
1 − δA(1 − µ)
≡ ψ1 > 0 for δA > 0.
The other point (uA,uA) ∈ V A can analogously be constructed. In the ﬁrst period where history
is null, ﬁrms may start with any point. This result shows that in some parameter range, (i) if
41Without a prior assumption that On-IC
1


















42As for high-cost agents, IC-A
1























H), where the RHS becomes zero. Hence, both constraints are slack.
33agents ever care about the future (δA > 0), then suﬃciently patient ﬁrms can reduce information
rents (and thus increase their expected proﬁts) and (ii) if δA → 1, then they may approximate
the ﬁrst-best proﬁt. This striking result is due to the interaction between internal contracting and
market-sharing arrangement.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated a commonly observed collusive behavior, price-ﬁxing with market-
share allocation, when private information is held by the agent who engages in production. We
established two classes of an optimal collusion and found some features that are not observed
in no-agent models. In particular, our ﬁndings provided a new perspective on collusive conduct,
arguing that colluding ﬁrms, facing the contrasting incentives on internal and inter-ﬁrm level, may
be able to exploit the interaction between internal contracting and market-sharing arrangement.
The presence of privately-informed agents may thus provide ﬁrms with a strategic opportunity to
achieve an optimal APPE in a wider parameter range and save a potential waste of optimal SPPE
values. The argument can be extended at a broad level: if each ﬁrm has to determine whether it
should identify its agent’s cost type (with informational costs) before signing the internal contract,
then it may deliberately delay getting informed of its agent’s cost type to take advantage of the
strategic opportunity.
In the literature, ﬁrms own private information; ﬁrms can observe and distort private infor-
mation at no extra costs. The contractual arrangement in this paper captures the circumstance
in which ﬁrms deliberately reduce the degree to which they control of private information; their
incentive to distort the agents’ private information is bounded by the contract with agents. We
showed that a very simple contractual arrangement that reduces the ﬁrms’ incentive to distort the
agents’ private information makes it possible to establish a suﬃciently long Pareto-frontier segment
in APPE and avoid wasteful continuation-value transfers in SPPE. The internal incentive problem
seen here is not new, and market-allocation collusion is commonly observed. Despite extensive
research, the literature that links the two is rarely found. Our paper raises new challenging ques-
tions: What is the degree of asymmetric information within ﬁrms? How is the degree to which
ﬁrms own private information related to inter-ﬁrm behaviors?
34Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Given the contract deﬁn e di n( 5 )a n d( 6 )a n dt h eﬁxed price ρ, the interim-
stage proﬁts for ﬁrm i are
Ui(H,H)=( ρ − θH)qi
H + δvi
H
Ui(L,H)=( ρ − θH)qi












Before we prove Lemma 2, we ﬁrst show that a weak monotonicity, qi
L ≥ qi
H, is a necessary feature
of equilibrium, since the on-schedule constraints, Ui(H,H) ≥ Ui(L,H) and Ui(L,L) ≥ Ui(H,L),
imply the weak monotonicity. To see this, note that the on-schedule constraints imply
Ui(H,H) − Ui(H,L) ≥ Ui(L,H) − Ui(L,L).







+ α(ρ − θH)(qi
L − qi
H) ≥ 0. (A1)




We next prove Lemma 2. The binding On-ICi
H implies that
Ui(H,H)=Ui(L,H)=( ρ − θH)qi




It then follows that







+ α(ρ − θH)(qi
L − qi
H) ≥ 0.
The last inequality comes from (A1). Lastly, we show that the term Ui(H,H) equals Ui(H,L):




=( ρ − θH)qi
H + δvi
H = Ui(H,H).
Hence, Ui(L,L) ≥ Ui(H,L) ∀α. Further, if qi
L > qi
H holds as in the optimal collusion, then
Ui(L,L) >U i(H,L) ∀α. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3. Before we establish the existence of V (α) ⊂ V m, we derive the equation
(9), which is a necessary feature implied by the the binding On-ICi

















































35The ﬁrst equality transforms the continuation values for ﬁrm 2 into the ones for ﬁrm 1; since













































(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (A3)
Thus, if V (α) exists, then its width must be at least as long as the RHS:
u − u ≥
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
We hereafter establish the existence of V (α). To this end, we ﬁrst construct an endpoint (u,u)
of a segment V (α). Consider a vector z(α):
z(α)=

     














LH =0 ) ,
v1
LH = v1





T represents the ﬁrm i’s market share when two ﬁrms tie as in (L,L) and (H,H), and
q1
T + q2
T =1 . Note that the continuation values, v1
HL and v1
LL, are not speciﬁed yet, and will be
deﬁned below. If On-ICi
H ∀i is binding, then the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is















Using the vector z(α) in (A4), we ﬁnd the values, u and u, in the self-generating set. Letting
u1 = u in (A5), we can ﬁnd
u =( ρ − θH)[1 − µ + µα(2µ − 1)]q1
T + 4µ(2µ − 1)q1
T (A6)
+( ρ − θH)µ(1 − µ)α + 4µ(1 − µ)+δ
£
µv1




















= δu+ µ(1 − α)(ρ − θH).
The ﬁrst equality holds because of (A3) and the second equality comes from (A4). Plugging this
into (A6), we can get
(1 − δ)u =( ρ − θH)[1− µ + µα(2µ − 1)]q1
T + 4µ(2µ − 1)q1
T (A7)
+( ρ − θH)µ(1 − µα)+4µ(1 − µ).
36Likewise, letting u2 = u in (A5), we can ﬁnd
(1 − δ)u =( ρ − θH)[1− µ + µα(2µ − 1)]q2
T + 4µ(2µ − 1)q2
T (A8)
+( ρ − θH)µ(1 − µ)α + 4µ(1 − µ).
N o t et h a tal i n es e g m e n tV (α)=[ ( u,u),(u,u)] achieves the optimality, V (α) ⊂ V m:







We next look for the range of α in which the constraint Add-IC is satisﬁed. We claim that the
constraint Add-IC is binding,
u − u =
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
, (A9)











2(1 − µ)+2 µ(2µ − 1)(α + γ)
. (A10)
To prove this, we plug (A7) and (A8) into (A9), recollecting q2
T =1− q1
T and γ = 4/(ρ − θH). If
ﬁrm 1 is in the least favored position (q1
T = q1
LL = q1
HH =0 ) , then we can get
α∗(δ) ≡
1 − δ + δ(2µ − 1)(1 − µγ)
1 − δ + δ2µ2 . (A11)
It follows from (A10) that (i) if α = α∗(δ), then q1
T =0 , (ii) if α∗(δ) <α<1, then 0 <q 1
T < 1
2
and (iii) if α =1 , then q1
T = 1
2. Hence, for any α ≥ α∗(δ) for a given δ, there exists a vector z(α)
in which Add-IC is binding.
We next verify that all the continuation values are drawn from the segment V (α): vi
ij ∈
V (α) ∀i,(j,k). By the vector z(α), all the continuation values are in V (α) except v1
HL and v1
LL,
which are not speciﬁed by z(α) in (A4). We thus need to prove that given the vector z(α),v 1
HL
and v1
LL are also drawn from V (α): u ≤ v1
HL ≤ u and u ≤ v1
LL ≤ u. Recall that the continuation
value v1








(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
≤ u.
The last inequality comes from Add-IC. If q1
T is chosen as in (A10), then Add-IC is binding as in
(A9) and
v1
HL = u +
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
= u.
Thus, if Add-IC is binding, then v1
HL = u, and if Add-IC is slack, then u <v 1
HL < u. The
continuation value v1
LL is determined to satisfy the binding On-IC1
H:
v1











Given the assumption µ>1
2,u≤ v1
LL ≤ u. Hence, vi
ij ∈ V (α) ∀i,(j,k).
37We now prove that all the on-schedule constraints are satisﬁed. On-IC1
H is binding, since v1
LL
is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC1
H. Given that v1
HL is chosen to satisfy (A2), we can conﬁrm
that On-IC2
H also is binding:
δ(v2
H − v2






=( 1 − α)µ(ρ − θH)
£
(2µ − 1)q2
T +( 1− µ)
¤
.
Under z(α), the RHS of On-IC2




LH +( 1− µ)v2
HH − µv2















− (1 − µ)
µ
u −
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
¶¸
=( 1− α)µ(ρ − θH)
£
(2µ − 1)q2





HL, are given by (A12) and (A13) and by the condition, v1
jk + v2
jk = u + u
∀(j,k). Thus, On-IC2
H is binding. We then invoke Lemma 2 to show that since On-ICi
H ∀i is
binding, On-ICi
L ∀i is slack. Hence, all the on-schedule constraints are satisﬁed.
Until now, we have found that for α ≥ α∗(δ), there exists a vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) that estab-
lishes the endpoint (u,u). Letting z0(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) denote an analogous vector that implements
the other endpoint, the remainder of the segment can be established with the convex combination
of z(α) and z0(α). This is possible, since for any α, ﬁrms’ payoﬀs and the on-schedule constraints
are linear in terms of market shares and continuation values.
Lastly, we show that Add-IC can be slack in the range {(δ,α):α∗(δ) <α≤ 1}. To this end,
consider the vector z(α) in which Add-IC is binding under α = α∗(δ) for a given δ. Then, this
vector z(α) speciﬁes q1














For an alternative contract xi(b α), where b α = b α(δ) >α ∗(δ) for a given δ, deﬁne a vector z(b α) in
which q1
T =0is preserved and continuation values are assigned as in z(α) except that b α replaces α
in v1
HL and v1
LL. Then, it follows that the vector z(b α) (along with z0(b α)) can establish the value set
V (b α) whose width is longer than the width of V (α), since u is higher and u lower under b α = b α(δ)
than under α = α∗(δ). On the other hand, the RHS of Add-IC is lower under b α = b α(δ) than under
α = α∗(δ):
(1 − b α)(ρ − θH)
δ
<
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
.
Hence, Add-IC is slack. Note that when Add-IC is slack, v1
HL = u +
(1−e α)(ρ−θH)
δ < u. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .To establish the existence of V (α) and V (β), the proof focuses on
the two vectors z(α) and z(β) when α = α∗(δ) and β = β∗(δ), respectively. In these cases, q1
T =0 .




     



















It is shown by the proof of Lemma 3 that (i) all the on-schedule constraints and Add-IC are satisﬁed
and (ii) vi
ij ∈ V (α) ∀i,(j,k). It now suﬃces to prove that oﬀ- s c h e d u l ec o n s t r a i n t sa r es a t i s ﬁed. We
restrict attention to the Oﬀ-IC of ﬁrm 1 that is the least favored position at the endpoint (u,u).
Because 4·q1
H =0under z(α), the associated oﬀ-schedule constraints are
δ(v1



















H =0under z(α), Oﬀ-IC1
LH is slack and Oﬀ-IC1
HL is implied
by Oﬀ-IC1




LL − v) ≥ ρ − θL and δ(v1

















(ρ − θH)+µ(1 − µ)4
1 − δ
.
Plugging the values with α = α∗(δ) into two inequalities, we can get δ∗
LL and δ∗
HH. The critical
discount factor is δ∗ =m a x {δ∗
LL,δ∗
HH}.
Suppose next that ρ<C H.F o rβ = β∗(δ), deﬁne a vector z(β):
z(β)=

     




















(1 − β)(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (A16)
Thus, if a line segment V (β) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently long:
u − u ≥
(1 − β)(2 − µ)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
39The continuation values, v1
HL and v1
LL, are determined as follows. The value v1





(1 − β)(2 − µ)(r − θH)
δ
= u +




LL is chosen to satisfy the binding On-IC1
H:
v1
LL = u +
3µ − µ2 − 1
µ
·




H ∀i is binding, then the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ takes the same form as (A5). Letting
u1 = u and u2 = u, the vector z(β) yields
u =






Note that u decreases in β whereas u increases in β, and that
u + u =






We now conﬁrm that all the constraints hold. If Add-IC holds, then u <v 1




then u <v 1
LL < u. Hence, vi
jk ∈ V (β) ∀i,(j,k). Because of the binding On-IC1
H and the equation
(A2), On-IC2
H is binding. It follows from Lemma 2 that if On-ICi
H is binding, then On-ICi
L is
slack. Lastly, the level of β = β∗(δ) is determined to satisfy Add-IC:
β ≥ β∗(δ) ≡ max
½
(2 − µ)(1− δ + µδ) − µ2δγ




If the ﬁrst term in max{·,·} is positive, then Add-IC is binding, and if it is negative, then Add-IC
is slack. Hence, z(β) satisﬁes all the on-schedule constraints and constructs the endpoint (u,u).
The remainder of V (β) is constructed by a convex combination of two analogous vectors. The
previous arguments directly hold; when β rises, the width of V (β) is lengthened. As above, the













≥ ρ − θH.




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .We here focus on the case of α = α∗ (δ) for any δ. The extension
t ot h ec a s eo fα>α ∗ (δ) follows the previous proof. To establish an endpoint (u,u) of a segment
40V (α), consider a vector z(α):
z(α) ≡

     





















(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (A20)
Thus, if V (α) ⊂ V m exists, then its width must be suﬃciently long:
u − u ≥
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
. (Add-IC)
The continuation value v1
HL is chosen to satisfy (A20):
v1
HL = u +
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
δ
(A21)
The continuation value v1
LL is determined to satisfy the binding On-IC1
H:
v1








H ∀i is binding, then the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ takes the same form as (A5). Letting
u1 = u and u2 = u, the vector z(α) yields
u =
[1 + µ − µ(1 + µ)α](ρ − θH)+µ(1 − µ)4
2(1 − δ)
u =




u + u =
ρ − E (θ)
1 − δ
∀α.
As above, the value u increases in α but u decreases in α. We next show that all the constraints
are satisﬁed. If Add-IC holds, then u <v 1
HL ≤ u, and that if µ>1
3, then u <v 1
LL < u. Hence,
vi
jk ∈ V (β) ∀i,(j,k). Because of the binding On-IC1
H and the equation (A2), On-IC2
H is binding.
By Lemma 2, On-ICi
L is slack. The level of α = α∗(δ) is determined to satisfy the binding Add-IC:
α∗ (δ) ≡
1 − δ + δµ(1 − µγ)
1 − δ + δµ(1 + µ)
.
Hence, if α = α∗(δ), there exists the vector z(α) ∈ ZIC(V (α)) that can establish the endpoint
(u,u). The remainder of the segment can be established by convex combination of z(α) and z0(α).






















≥ ρ − θH − (ρ − θH)q1
HL (Oﬀ-IC1
HL)









LL for all µ>1
3. The oﬀ-schedule constraints are reduced
to Oﬀ-IC1
LL and Oﬀ-IC1
HH. Plugging the continuation values with α = α∗(δ) into the inequalities,
we can get δ∗ =m a x {δ∗
LL,δ∗
HH}. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. We here conﬁrm that the vector z(α) satisﬁes the on-schedule
constraints. Under z(α), the continuation value vi
LL is chosen to satisfy the binding On-ICi
H. If
On-ICi
H is binding, then On-ICi
L is slack by Lemma 2. Add-IC is satisﬁed by the choice of ρ.
Because of the binding Add-IC, vi
LL in (23) becomes
vi
LL = u −
(1 − α)(ρ − θH)
2δµ
= u.
It follows that all the continuation values are drawn from V s(α): vi
jk = u except vi
LL = u ∀i,(j,k).















The RHS represents the current-period gain that a high-cost ﬁrm can make when it lies. Given
the continuation values and (28), the LHS boils down to δµ(u−u)=
(1−α)(ρ−θH)
2 . As i m p l i ﬁcation
shows that On-ICi
H becomes ρ ≥ ρ. Thus, as indicated by (26), this constraint is slack (binding) if











T h i sc a nb er e a r r a n g e da s(1 − α)(ρ − θH) ≤ ρ − θL. If α rises, then the LHS falls, but the RHS
rises because the price ρ in (26) rises. This inequality is thus reduced to












Hence, the vectors z(α) and z0(α) satisfy the on-schedule constraints if α ≥ α∗(δ). This range of
α counters the low-cost ﬁrm’s incentive to overstate its cost type and avoid the possible future
penalty. ¥
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